Priorities for Government Policy in Yemen

This policy brief outlines recommendations for the immediate priorities of the Government of Yemen, both to achieve quick wins and to prepare the ground for medium and long-term success. These recommendations are the outcomes of in-depth discussions held during the fourth Development Champions Forum convened on December 8-11, 2018, in Amman, Jordan. They are designed to offer Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed and his cabinet a set of practical measures to help the government build on the momentum and increased visibility it achieved in the final quarter of 2018.

The immediate priorities recommended by the Development Champions include steps to support the stabilization of the local currency. an area in which tangible progress has already been made. The Champions also urge the government to regularize the payment of public sector salaries and pensions. Another immediate priority for the government should be to take steps to stabilize and transform Aden, the Champions suggest, based on the shared consensus that the southern coastal city could become a model for the rest of Yemen. The Champions emphasized that developing Aden would depend on improving the level of security across the governorate.

While recognizing that the government faces immediate challenges that demand attention in Aden and across the country, the Development Champions urge the government to plan and implement procedures to prepare for the country’s medium and long-term future. These strategies should address the root causes of Yemen’s socio-economic instability, and not just its symptoms.

Among the most important actions to prepare for long-term priorities is the expansion of the roles and responsibilities of local government authorities, the Champions concluded. During the conflict, decision-making authority has filtered down to the local level and become far more decentralized. The government should build on this new reality to reconfigure the state and its relationship with local government authorities.

Recommendations

The following recommendations for the Government of Yemen are divided in two sections: quick wins (immediate priorities) and actions for medium and long-term priorities. Recommendations for immediate priorities are presented in three categories: the first addresses measures to support the stabilization of the Yemeni rial; the second identifies steps to regularize the payment of public sector salaries and pensions; and the third outlines ways to stabilize and transform Aden into a model for the rest of Yemen. Actions to prepare for Yemen’s mid- and long-term priorities are then presented. These include recommendations to expand the roles of local government authorities; restore confidence in the state; develop pilot development programs; increase state efficiency; and restructure government debt.

Immediate Priorities:

1. Continued Stabilization of the Local Currency and Market Exchange Rates

The Government of Yemen should take the following actions to build on the recent progress made toward stabilizing the Yemeni rial and market exchange rates. Currency fluctuations directly affect the prices of food and other basic commodities and thus impact the lives of all Yemeni citizens.

  • Activate local revenue collection, such as the collection of fees and taxes from local businesses as well as the general public.
  • Protect and increase foreign currency reserves to help the Central Bank regulate and facilitate commercial imports and make commodities available on the domestic market.
    • One way to increase foreign currency reserves would be to convince international stakeholders to: (i) release funds that have been frozen since the relocation of the Central Bank in September 2016 to the temporary headquarters in Aden; (ii) make additional deposits in the Central Bank to add to the $2bn Saudi deposit, and (iii) transfer humanitarian aid funds via the Central Bank.
      • A donor conference could be held to secure additional funds to activate the economy and to support the current efforts to shift imports, domestic trade and financial flows from the informal to the formal economy.
    • Make better use of Yemeni commercial banks’ foreign assets to help underwrite the Letters of Credit issued to merchants to import essential commodities, and better utilize foreign currency resources such as wire transfers from international organizations, revenues from oil sales and remittances, instead of being overly reliant on the unsustainable Saudi deposit.
  • Better manage public debt and liquidity, for example by finding alternative ways to increase the amount of local currency managed by the Central Bank, other than printing banknotes, which leads to inflation.
  • Boost the capacity of the Central Bank in Aden to ensure the stability of the exchange rate and to complement government fiscal and monetary policies.
  • Consult regularly with Yemeni commercial and Islamic banks and major importers of basic commodities about the various mechanism and bylaws related to organizing imports and provisions of needed funds for importers.
  • Monitor and regulate licenses issued to money exchangers more closely and utilize them to stabilize the prices of exchange.

2. Regularize Payment of Public Sector Salaries and State Pensions

The Government of Yemen should prioritize the payment of public sector employee salaries and state pensions, not least because the infrequent payment of these salaries has reduced individual purchasing power and thus exacerbated the severe humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The infrequent payment of salaries has also contributed to the collapse of the education and healthcare sectors. With this in mind, the Development Champions present the following recommendations:

  • Pay the salaries of all public sector employees in state administration units across the country – in accordance with the Ministry of Civil Service and Insurance data recorded in 2014.
    • The payment of public sector employees working in the education and healthcare sectors should be prioritized, as these sectors represent 85% of all employees in state administration units.
  • Pay the state pensions of all retirees located across the country who previously qualified for pensions and completed their pension application process.
  • Coordinate with Yemeni commercial and Islamic banks to ensure that public sector employees’ salaries and state pensions are paid regularly and directly through commercial banks.
    • Part of this process could be to ensure that all approved recipients have an active account with a Yemeni commercial or Islamic bank.
  • Establish a rigorous electronic system to stop the duplication of payments for public sector employees – in accordance with the Ministry of Civil Service and Insurance data recorded in 2014.
    • Biometric data should be used to maintain accuracy, prevent fraud, avoid duplicate payments and ensure that money allocated for public sector salaries and state pensions reaches the intended beneficiaries.
  • Request support from the Saudi-led coalition to cover any financial deficit resulting from the expansion of payments to public sector employees and retirees.

3. Transforming Aden into a Model

While acknowledging that the security situation in Aden is in flux, the Government of Yemen should start taking steps that would allow the stabilization and transformation of Aden into a fully-functioning city and governorate. The government should prioritize the development of economic facilities and local infrastructure as well as the provision of essential services and security. The government must deliver a message that it is capable of creating a secure environment from which to govern and develop local areas, addressing the issues that have limited Aden’s progress, despite the liberation of the city in July 2015.

Develop Aden’s Economic Resources and Infrastructure:

  • Increase the capacity of the airport, port and refinery in Aden to enhance business activity and generate additional revenues. To achieve this, the government will need to address a number of obstacles that currently prevent these vital economic and transport facilities from reaching their full potential and that also limit private sector engagement.
  • Reduce the time it takes for importers to bring commercial goods into Yemen via Aden Port.
  • Work with international organizations and shipping and insurance companies to reduce shipping costs.
    • For example, the government addressed the sudden rise in insurance fees following the attack on the French oil tanker MV Limburg off Yemen’s coast in October 2002 by establishing an escrow account to cover any insurance claims, which helped bring down insurance fees significantly.
  • Improve the services and security procedures at Aden International Airport and examine the scope for additional international flights and airlines at the airport.
  • Ensure the provision of vital services like healthcare, electricity, water, waste collection and sanitation, and combat the spread of sewage water.
  • Carry out maintenance work on the roads across Aden and connecting roads to other governorates in addition to reopening any roads that are currently closed, for example where armed groups have established security checkpoints.
  • Rebuild civilian homes damaged by fighting in Aden.
  • Renovate schools and open additional classrooms to reduce overcrowding in schools.
  • Activate the bureaus and executive offices of the different ministries.

Security:

  • Prevent the carrying of weapons inside the city and implement campaigns to prevent the proliferation of arms.
  • Ensure the freedom of movement of people and goods into and throughout Aden, while addressing any violations such as those experienced by northerners traveling to or from Aden.
    • Clamp down on people demanding bribes to allow the movement of people and goods.
      • Reopening closed roads could help to address this problem by providing alternative routes. Where only one road is available, it is easier for bribes to be extorted from travellers.
  • Introduce new traffic regulations and monitor compliance to improve road safety.
    • These regulations should include the introduction of a new mechanism or database to issue car registration numbers and license plates.
  • Enhance the ability of the police and judiciary to improve security and respect for the rule of law.
    • Seek technical support to improve policing and safety, for example by introducing CCTV as a deterrent and to identify lawbreakers.

Empower Members of the Local Community:

  • Build channels of communication and modes of participation for local community leaders in the city.

Actions to Prepare for Medium and Long-term Priorities:

1. Activate and Expand the Roles and Responsibilities of Local Authorities

  • Reconfigure the relationship between the central and local government at both the governorate and district level, ensuring greater local decision-making authority.
  • Seek greater input from civil society representatives as well as other local community leaders.
  • Assess local revenue streams and potential economic growth at the governorate and district level.

2. Restore Confidence in  the State

  • Use successes in public policy to restore people’s confidence in the state, premised on the idea that the state is able to deliver its citizens a better future and uphold the principle of equal citizenship.
  • Develop ‘branding’ and communications campaigns to publicize the government’s achievements, like delivering public services and improving public infrastructure, and to unite people around shared ideals. Lessons can be learnt from other regional countries’ experiences.

3. Develop Economic Models from Pilot Programs

  • Plan and implement a series of pilot programs at the local level to foster socioeconomic development, initially at a number of rural villages throughout the country. The planning process should begin immediately.
    • These model villages could provide a blueprint that could be exported to other rural areas in the country.
    • Pilot programs should then be introduced in select urban areas and potential projects should be identified in sectors that can harness future economic growth, such as the alternative energy sector.
  • Ensure greater private sector involvement in the planning and implementation of local development projects and pilot programs.
  • At a later stage, examine the possibility of initiating large-scale development projects that will provide local employment, such as the construction of main roads and a national railway line. The government should take the lead on any large-scale infrastructure development projects, but also seek the involvement of the private sector in the planning and implementation process.

4. Increase State Efficiency

  • Develop a mechanism for strategic planning to map out specific procedures to enhance the performance of the state, for example to improve the functioning of state institutions, the provision of basic services and security and local development.
    • Potential agents to oversee this strategic planning include the Office of the Prime Minister or the Supreme Economic Council, the latter of which still needs to be reactivated.
    • Re-form the cabinet and replace it with a smaller technocratic government that is commensurate with the challenges on the ground, and increase its effectiveness and integrity.
  • Run a series of transparency and accountability campaigns to enhance trust in the state and the actions taken by the government, the results of which should be made public. These campaigns should then become permanent practice and extended.
  • Develop electronic databases to register and update citizen and resident information, including a national census.
  • Re-activate the monitoring and accountability institutions and integrity committee, and contract auditing firms to audit the work of the various state institutions, especially the income-generating and service institutions. Also, reactivate anti-corruption mechanisms to address the rampant corruption at the different levels of the state.

5. Debt Restructuring

  • Begin work on a plan for restructuring the external and internal debt, as the gross domestic debt reached  YR 3.273 trillion (US$15.233 billion) in 2014, while the gross external debt was US$7.3 billion in the same year.
Priorities for Government Policy in Yemen
February 5, 2019

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Executive Summary

This paper examines governance as the decisive factor shaping the success or failure of government reforms and current government plans in Yemen. It starts from a central premise: Yemen’s reform crisis is not primarily a crisis of planning or vision, but a crisis of structural weakness in the governance system that should regulate policy design, implementation, monitoring, and accountability. Yemeni experience, before and during the war, shows that reforms without a clear governance framework become formal decisions that are selectively implemented, stripped of substance, or unable to deliver sustainable impact.

The paper demonstrates that the implementation gap represents the central challenge facing government reforms—a gap resulting from overlapping mandates, multiple decision-making centers, weak institutional coordination, absence of effective accountability, lack of transparency and data, as well as the chronic disconnect between financial and institutional reforms. It also shows that corruption in the Yemeni context is no longer an isolated administrative phenomenon but has become part of deeper dysfunctions in the state’s political economy, making its treatment possible only through comprehensive governance reforms, not through discrete oversight tools.

Through analysis of a case study involving clearly formulated reforms that later stalled in implementation, the paper concludes that political decisions alone are not enough to ensure execution in the absence of an integrated governance system. Weak effective executive authority, the absence of a clear accountability chain, undeclared institutional resistance, and poor alignment between reforms and institutional capacities all contribute to disruption and operational paralysis.

Based on this diagnosis, the paper proposes a practical governance framework for reforms in Yemen. The framework treats reform as a continuous political-institutional process rather than an isolated technical or financial intervention. It is built on the need for a unified national reference for reform governance, clear mechanisms for assigning roles across institutions, a workable balance between centralization and local governance, and the integration of transparency and information systems at the core of the reform cycle. It also adopts a gradual approach that builds trust and reduces implementation resistance.

In light of this framework, the paper presents a package of practical recommendations to strengthen the governance of government reforms. These include adopting a unified national framework for institutional performance governance, strengthening financial governance through budget discipline and expenditure control, establishing a unified digital data system, and activating central and local accountability mechanisms based on clear performance standards, while also allowing regulated exceptional tools for economic crisis management. The paper emphasizes that these recommendations can succeed only through clear role distribution among the central government, local authorities, the private sector, civil society, and international partners, within a single national framework that leads the reform process without replacing state institutions.

The paper concludes that governance is not a procedural issue or an external condition, but rather the most realistic entry point for reconsidering government plans and transforming them into effective tools for economic recovery and institutional stability. Without systematically addressing governance gaps, government reforms will remain vulnerable to stumbling regardless of their technical quality or the support allocated to them. Building a clear and implementable governance system represents a genuine opportunity to rebuild trust between the state and society, improve resource utilization efficiency, and put Yemen on a more sustainable reform path.

Message to Decision Makers (Executive Note)

Why this paper now?
The Yemeni government today does not primarily suffer from a lack of plans or weak vision; it suffers from a chronic inability to convert approved decisions and plans into tangible results. Experience shows that this pattern undermines the credibility of political decision-making and reduces reforms to low-cost rhetorical commitments for actors who do not intend to comply.

What does this paper show?
This paper proceeds from a clear premise: the reform crisis in Yemen is a governance implementation crisis, not a policy crisis. Government reforms, regardless of their technical quality or political level, will not be automatically implemented in the absence of a governance framework linking decision, implementing entity, resources, follow-up, and accountability.

What does political decision-making require now?
Addressing this gap does not require launching new plans. It requires specific decisions that reorganize how reforms themselves are managed, strengthen the implementation and accountability chain, and protect political decisions from undeclared institutional disruption.

Risks of inaction
Continuing the current situation means the persistence of implementation gaps, erosion of domestic and international confidence, and transformation of reforms into accumulated political and administrative burdens. This paper presents a practical framework for reform governance without creating parallel structures or suspending accountability rules, preserving the role of state institutions and enhancing their implementation capacity.

April 30, 2026

Executive Summary
The Republic of Yemen today faces one of the most complex investment environments in the region. This reality is the result of structural weaknesses that predated the war and were then intensified by political and institutional fragmentation, security deterioration, and economic collapse. Even so, international experience in fragile and conflict-affected states suggests that Yemen can combine high levels of risk with promising investment opportunities in sectors that can operate before full peace is achieved – provided that reforms are clear, political will exists domestically, and regional support is active.

Over the past decade, the war has produced financial and monetary fragmentation, multiple decisionmaking centers, and divergent laws and procedures. This has created two distinct economic environments: one in government-controlled (liberated) areas and another in Houthi-controlled areas. The result has been a sharp decline in confidence, weaker institutions, severe deterioration in purchasing power, and a continuing fall in the Riyal’s value, alongside rising operating, transport, and insurance costs. At the same time, many of these constraints predate the war: even before the conflict, Yemen was a difficult investment environment due to corruption, complex procedures, a weak judiciary, widespread illegal levies, and capture of state resources by influential power centers.

Despite this bleak picture, the regional and international context offers encouraging indicators that investment space can still be created, especially in government-controlled (liberated) governorates. Compared with Houthi-controlled areas, these governorates offer internationally recognized legal authority, open ports, limited but workable banking channels through official institutions, and stronger prospects for investor protection through international arbitration.

International experience in Iraq, Lebanon, Rwanda, and other conflict-affected countries shows that investment can begin gradually in sectors least affected by war, and that success in fragile environments depends on four pillars: understanding risks while limiting exposure, strong risk management, clear government reforms, and organized regional and international support. With current Gulf investment shifts toward Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, Yemen – given its geostrategic location along major trade routes, its young population, and its strategic relevance to Gulf security – is a logical candidate to attract part of these investment flows.

There are also conflict-compatible sectors that can be entered today, such as:

  • Solar energy and electricity distribution
  • Telecommunications and digital transformation Transportation and logistics services and port development
  • Agriculture, fisheries, and food industries
  • Limited tourism projects
  • Economic and industrial zones, supply chains, and related services

These sectors operate by their nature in unstable environments and do not require comprehensive national stability, and can be a starting point.

The paper emphasizes that investment in Yemen, at this stage, cannot be treated as an unrestricted open
field. It must be governed by clear requirements, including a government commitment to supporting
investment, legislative reform, procedure digitization, elimination of illegal levies, access to international
arbitration, specialized government units for investor services, and the launch of a unified investment
window in Aden. It also requires regional guarantees and practical enablers through direct partnerships
with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf countries.

Foreign investment also requires active participation by the Yemeni private sector through alliances,
stronger governance standards, audited financial statements, and partnerships with Gulf investors through joint ventures (JVs) rather than stand-alone efforts. It also calls for a new donor role that goes beyond relief to support joint investment, improve the business environment, and provide financing guarantees and blended-finance tools.

Geographically, while the analysis covers Yemen as a whole, the practical application of opportunities
focuses on government-controlled (liberated) governorates. This reflects the current impracticality of
operating in the Houthi-controlled environment, which is marked by sanctions, extortion, capital flight,
institutional destruction, tight control over companies, and the absence of minimum legal and institutional guarantees for local and foreign investors.

The paper concludes that Yemen, despite its fragility, possesses rare strength elements in the region,
including:

  • Strategic location on the most important maritime routes
  • A large and young market exceeding 40 million people
  • Low operating costs
  • Diverse natural resources
  • Growing Gulf and international interest in Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab security
  • Sectors ready to operate within 12-24 months

The paper presents practical recommendations for the Yemeni government, the Yemeni and Gulf private
sectors, and donors aimed at transforming Yemen’s investment environment from a deterrent environment into an enabling one through short- and medium-term reforms, strategic partnerships, and a limited number of high-impact model projects that can build confidence and unlock larger investment flows later.

Based on this analysis, foreign investment in Yemen is difficult but not impossible. In the right regional
context and with clear government reforms, it can become a major driver of economic stability, a lever for reconstruction, and a tool for integrating Yemen into the Gulf and wider regional economy. The most logical starting point is in government-controlled (liberated) governorates and in sectors compatible with the current conflict context, before moving to larger projects in a later political settlement phase.

April 18, 2026

The war has fundamentally altered Yemen’s trade finance system, transforming it from a reliable, unified, bank-led mechanism into several divergent, conflicting structures that have made import financing cumbersome, costly, and unstable. The conflict has led to the suspension of oil and gas exports — the country’s primary source of revenue and foreign currency — and resulted in the division of key economic institutions across regional zones of control. Specifically, the fragmentation of the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) into rival branches (Sana’a and Aden) and the subsequent prevalence of dual currency and monetary systems has created a complex trade financing landscape. The two branches have engaged in a power struggle, issuing conflicting monetary and financial policies that weaponize all aspects of import regulation and financing.

The collapse of the formal banking system, combined with liquidity shortages, has eroded confidence in banks’ financial services and entrenched the rise of less-regulated financial transfer networks, which dominate the monetary cycle and trade facilitation. The fragmented regulatory environment has heightened the country’s vulnerability to global de-risking measures and exposed it to severe risks related to Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements. Yemeni banks have struggled to access foreign correspondent banks, which has inflated import costs and exacerbated food insecurity in a country that imports up to 90 percent of its basic staples from abroad.

The US designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and subsequent sanctions catalyzed a significant shift away from Yemen’s historically centralized financial system. The sanctions forced banks to relocate to government-controlled areas, eliminating the Houthis’ dominance over their primary operations. Today, these relocated banks are facing operational challenges due to the historic centrality of the financial system, the commercial market, and customer base in Houthi-controlled areas.

After the failure of several import financing mechanisms, the internationally recognized government, along with the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden (CBY-Aden), has recently begun implementing much-anticipated economic reforms that have stabilized the Yemeni rial. These reforms helped institutionalize a new mechanism for trade finance, culminating in the establishment of the National Committee for Regulating and Financing Imports.

 

To effectively operate on the ground, the Import Committee and CBY-Aden need to be fully empowered to curb currency destabilization and secure hard currency inflows, and to use those funds to finance basic commodity imports. The government should create a conducive business environment for banks to provide financial services and facilitate trade nationwide. Additionally, it should shift from short-term collective measures to long-term economic reforms. These should include working to access sustainable sources of hard currency to finance trade. Sustained financial support from Saudi Arabia and other donors is critical to replenishing the CBY-Aden’s foreign reserves and preserving the value of the rial.

Close coordination with international financial institutions and US decisionmaking bodies (such as the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control) is essential to enhance Yemeni banks’ capacity to comply with AML/CFT standards. Houthi authorities must suspend punitive measures against banks and traders and refrain from any future actions that could further deepen the monetary division and complicate trade financing.

In parallel, the UN and broader international community should exert immediate pressure on the warring parties to halt their weaponization of trade financing and respect the neutrality of the banking sector. They should help establish sanctions safeguards to protect humanitarian and remittance flows. As circumstances improve, the international community should support the creation of a nationwide trade financing scheme that is technically effective and insulated from political conflict.

February 17, 2026

Yemen’s e-commerce sector holds significant potential to drive economic growth and financial inclusion, particularly for women and rural communities, but faces major challenges, including poor internet connectivity, limited digital payment systems, and the absence of legal and regulatory frameworks. The country remains heavily cash-based, with minimal access to formal banking and fragmented oversight, exposing consumers and providers to fraud and limiting sector development. Internet infrastructure is among the worst globally, with only 17.7 percent of the population online in 2024, though the recent introduction of Starlink offers hope for improved connectivity. Conflict-related damage to transportation networks further hinders delivery services. Despite these obstacles, some businesses have found success, especially in urban areas, by adapting to logistical constraints. Yemen’s youthful, increasingly smartphone-connected population, along with emerging technologies and business models, offers promising opportunities for inclusive e-commerce growth—provided that policymakers invest in digital infrastructure, enact protective regulations, and create a supportive environment for online enterprise.

Select Recommendations

  • International organizations should focus on investing in satellite services like Starlink, and the government should focus its efforts on a successful rollout.
  • International development institutions should support a more cohesive regulatory framework with significant oversight and enforcement capabilities.
  • The Central Bank in Aden should strengthen its governance and improve regulatory gaps, such as e-commerce regulation.
  • The government and international organizations should aim to raise digital literacy and consumer awareness, especially of vulnerable and disenfranchised populations.
  • International donors and NGOs should support cybersecurity measures to improve trust in digital spaces and foster e-commerce growth.
  • Government entities should collaborate with the private sector to improve infrastructure, educate consumers, and incentivize digital payments.
  • The Ministry of Water and Environment should include environmental protections as part of the regulatory framework for e-commerce.
September 15, 2025

Historically, Yemen’s industrial sector has been characterized by small-scale, private initiatives, with 78% of establishments employing fewer than four workers and dominated by food, metal, and textile industries. Yemeni industry’s reliance on imported inputs and weak infrastructure left it vulnerable even before the 2015 escalation of war. Post-conflict damage has been extensive, with losses exceeding $35 billion, industrial output collapsing, and over half the workforce displaced. Legal frameworks exist but lack consistent enforcement. Gender disparities remain stark, with women accounting for just 1–6% of industrial employment. Environmental degradation further complicates recovery, driven by outdated laws and limited compliance capacity.

Despite this, some local industries have demonstrated resilience, particularly in informal light manufacturing. Drawing from regional and international models of industrialization, this RYE Policy Brief identifies viable paths for industrial renewal anchored in local resources, community participation, and adaptive governance.

Key Recommendations:
  • National Industrial Strategy:

Develop a national industrial strategy in partnership with the private sector, including identification of key sectors, support measures, and coordination mechanisms.

  • Regulatory Reform:

Simplify business registration, update laws, and establish industrial arbitration councils.

  • Women’s Inclusion:

Expand training, develop women-friendly zones, and launch targeted financing for female entrepreneurs.

  • Innovation & R&D:

Fund industrial research labs and foster private-sector innovation partnerships.

  • Infrastructure Development:

Rehabilitate industrial zones with solar energy, logistics hubs, and streamlined port access.

  • Access to Finance:

Create an Industrial Finance Fund and expand concessional credit for SMEs.

  • Environmental Sustainability:

Enforce pollution controls, incentivize clean tech adoption, and integrate safeguards into industrial planning.

September 8, 2025

Yemen is vulnerable to climate change and affected by ongoing conflict, facing worsening environmental crises such as water scarcity, degradation of arable land, and an increasing frequency of extreme weather events. The country’s capacity to address the impact of climate change is severely hampered by limited access to international climate finance. Obstacles include the absence of clear criteria for fund distribution, bureaucratic complexities that exceed local institutional capacity, an emphasis on mitigation over adaptation measures, and a preference for providing loans over grants. Fragmented governance and a decade-long climate data gap further undermine the country’s eligibility for funding. Yemen lacks accredited national institutions capable of directly accessing climate funds, which forces it to rely on international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). This reliance introduces additional layers of bureaucracy and high transaction costs.

This policy brief, based on a desk review and a two-day workshop held in Amman, Jordan, in November 2024, examines Yemen’s climate finance barriers and explores opportunities for improving its access to climate finance. The paper highlights funding allocation disparities, in which climate-vulnerable and fragile states receive disproportionately low shares of climate finance. For instance, Yemen received a mere US$0.60 per capita in adaptation finance between 2015 and 2021, compared to over US$100 per capita in stable countries during the same period.

The paper draws lessons from other countries, including Rwanda, Somalia, and Bangladesh, which improved access by utilizing national climate funds, engaging in diplomatic advocacy, and implementing community-based data initiatives. Recommendations emphasize urgent actions for Yemen’s government, including establishing a multi-stakeholder climate task force and climate fund, finalizing Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and enhancing regional cooperation. For international actors, reforms such as simplifying accreditation processes, prioritizing grants, and supporting climate diplomacy are critical.

August 11, 2025

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